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Abstract
Many Chinese enterprises face financing difficulties 
under current economic situation especially small and 
middle sized enterprises, the paper analyzes the problems 
of bank-enterprise relation in China, puts forward a new 
close bank-enterprise relation model that will benefit 
both banks and enterprise in reference to typical bank-
enterprise relation models in the world, which is different 
from the host bank system in existence and the close bank-
enterprise relation model prevails in western countries. 
The paper also gives some suggestions to construct such 
relation model. 
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INTRODUCTION
The transaction relation between banks and enterprises 
short for bank-enterprise relation is a series of contract 
arrangement between them focus on enterprise financing 
activities, which is one of main economic relations in 
market economy and has great influence on the running 
efficiency and stable development of the economy of a 
country.
At present, both banks and enterprises in China 
are caught in a dilemma, on one side, banks have too 
much fund they must pay a lot f interest but have great 
difficulties in lending, and on the other side, enterprises 
especially small and middle-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
get into financing trouble to the extent that they can’t 
get enough capital for business operation. What on 
earth results in the problems between capital supply and 
demand and what results in the uneasy relation between 
banks and enterprises, we believe the answer is the serious 
information asymmetry between commercial banks and 
enterprises that has too many adverse effects on the 
banks’ operation, so the paper puts forward a practical 
choice for the bank-enterprise relation model in China in 
consideration of the environment of banks and current 
situation of bank-enterprise relation. 
1 .   CURRENT STATUS OF BANK-
ENTERPRISE RELATION IN CHINA
The bank-enterprise relation in China has formed 
in the process of economic system changing from 
planning to market economy, so it has obvious features 
of economic reform. In planning economy time, the 
bank-enterprise relation was “supervise and being 
supervised” and “manager and being managed”. Along 
with the establishment of market economy system, their 
relation began to change. At present, the bank-enterprise 
relation in China is similar to market contracting model, 
namely, both banks and enterprises are legal entities 
operate independently and associate with each other by 
transaction. However, the bank-enterprise relation in 
China also has some characteristics of non-marketing 
because of administrative intervention of government.
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1.1  Enterprises are Very Week in Credit 
Awareness and Credit Constraint Softening is 
Serious 
Credit is the basis and soul of contract relation, however 
the phenomenon of losing honest and credit is very 
serious in China because banks and enterprises lack 
deep cooperation concept of interests interaction. Many 
Chinese enterprises open accounts in different names, get 
loans from different banks, and make every endeavor to 
avoid to repaying banks’ loans. On the other hand, it is 
difficult for banks to get true materials from enterprises 
to evaluate their credit, some banks complain that they 
even can’t get real accounting statement from enterprises. 
At present, the main financing source in China is still 
indirect financing, some enterprises fabricate accounting 
statements and make backdoor deals in order to get banks’ 
loan, which add their financing cost, together with high 
rate on borrowings and weak in profitability, repaying 
the principal and interest to banks put great burden on 
them, so the phenomenon of bank loans default can be 
found everywhere. The credit relation between banks and 
enterprises is softening constraint, but the banks’ liabilities 
are hard constraint since they must pay their depositors’ 
interests. The asymmetrical pattern of softening and hard 
constraint increases the risk of bank management and 
makes the bank-enterprise relation get into difficulty. 
1.2  It is Difficult for Enterprises to Borrow and 
Banks to Lend
Since 1994, the gap between loans and deposits in 
Chinese financial institutions has increased gradually to a 
point that catches the attention of economists and policy 
makers. As a developing country with rapid economic 
development, China should not a country with surplus 
capital, but banks’ difficulty in lending has been a serious 
problem that disturbs financial institutions. A large 
amount of deposit can’t be lent out and deposit interest 
is rigid, which is especially adverse to the development 
of commercial banks because most of their profit comes 
from the margin gap between deposit and loan rate, for 
example, the gap of deposit and loan rate of Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China contributed to 68% of 
its profit and that of China Construction Bank is 73.76% 
in the third quarter of 2011. However, most enterprises 
didn’t think the conditions on their loans are looser and it 
is more difficult for them to get loans from banks on the 
contrary. The situation mentioned above is not the same 
for all enterprises, on one side, some enterprises that are 
supported by national policies with better market prospect 
become the object that several banks compete for and on 
the other hand serious shortage of funds restricted the 
development of SMEs.
1.3  Banks’ Service is not Enough for Enterprises
Banks should provide full service for enterprises 
including loan, deposit, settlement, consultancy, and 
so on, but according to existing loan credit system, 
secondary branches and sub-branches of banks can only 
provide services in accordance with stipulated lines of 
credit and variety, which is not in favor of developing 
all-round cooperation with enterprises. In addition, 
the establishment of market economy system hasn’t 
real influence on the operation concept and strategy of 
commercial banks since they are still unaware of their 
status and function in the market economy, so the relation 
between banks and enterprises are not “provide service” 
and “accept service”. Some banks think that enterprises 
need banks’ support, sit back and wait for enterprises 
to drop in, as a result, they are in a passive status. Once 
problems occur on credit capital, banks always put blames 
on enterprises. When providing services to enterprises, 
banks always put forward many constraints and provide 
relatively less services. 
2.  THE CONSTRUCTION OF CLOSE 
BANK-ENTERPRISE RELATION
At present, there are three prevailing bank-enterprise 
relation models in the world, one is the market contract 
model represented by the United State established 
under mature market economy system and perfect legal 
environment, which is in favor of the development of 
banks, enterprises and the whole financial system. The 
other two are bank-dominated financial system represented 
by Japan and Germany that contributed greatly to the 
rapid development of them after World War Two. From 
the experience of above-mentioned three countries and the 
actual situation of Chinese financial market, we believe 
that China should establish close bank-enterprise relation 
model in reference to that of Japan and Germany, and 
simultaneously absorb the advantages of USA model, 
which is different from the host bank system of China in 
existence.
2.1  The Meaning of New-Type Bank-Enterprise 
Relation
The purpose to construct a new type host bank system 
is to improve current bank-enterprise relation and its 
meanings are as follow: 
(1) The host bank and the enterprise it provides service 
to combine with each other willingly according to the 
laws of market, they select mutually on the basis of credit 
without the administrative intervention of government.
(2) The New host bank system is suitable for all banks 
and enterprises in spite of their ownership structure and 
scale, which can prevent banks’ loan from concentrating 
on an industry or area excessively. 
(3) Banks’ non-equity participation in enterprises’ 
governance. Along with the reform of financial system, 
commercial banks and enterprises can hold shares of 
each other, for example, quite many shares of Bank of 
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Communications are hold by enterprises, which can 
make the bank-enterprise relation more closely, improve 
economic strength and reinforce profit mechanism. 
However, when banks are both creditors and shareholders, 
if they are in favor of some enterprise, unfair competition 
will occur. So we think that banks and enterprises should 
keep respective independence and autonomy in the 
process of establishing socialist market economy, if they 
are combined closely by cross-shareholding, it is more 
difficult to eliminate the intervention of power economy. 
(4) Banks and enterprises cooperate in the long run, 
which means an enterprise deals all  its deposit, loan, 
settlement, information and consultancy business with 
one bank, namely its host bank to show all its private 
information to the bank, so that to solve the problem of 
information asymmetry.
2.2  The Benefits of New-Type Bank-Enterprise 
Relation
(1) It will do favor for banks to take part in corporate 
governance
As the biggest creditor of an enterprise, it is necessary 
and feasible for a bank to take part in its debtor’s 
governance. We believe banks’ participation in corporate 
governance has more advantages than disadvantages, it 
will help banks to find out the problems of enterprises 
as early as possible so that to take effective preventive 
measures. New-type bank-enterprise relation entitles 
banks contingent governance and proxy voting to reinforce 
them to participate enterprise governance. So that banks 
can take use of their advantages in talents, capital and 
facilities to protect their interests as creditors and obtain 
more profits simultaneously. So it is meaningful for both 
rationalizing bank-enterprise relation and improving 
enterprise governance. 
(2) It will do favor to create relatively balanced 
information environment 
After establishing long-term and all-round cooperation, 
the host bank can observe and supervise an enterprise 
during long time to accumulate more information. The 
enterprise will be willing to disclose its real financial 
status to the bank in order to get loan from it. So the host 
bank system can effectively solve the problems resulted 
from asymmetrical information and prevent enterprises 
from opening accounts in different names, getting loans 
from several banks and transferring capital to avoiding 
repaying bank loans. Relatively balanced information 
environment will be good for preventing credit risk, 
banks’ pity on loans and local credit expansion. It will 
change banks’ way in lending and improve the allocation 
efficiency of banks’ capital. 
(3) It will be favor for enterprises (especially SMEs) to 
solve the problem of difficulty in loans
The largest problem that a bank face in the process of 
loan approval is information asymmetry, if it chooses to 
increase loan pricing to compensate the risk that will make 
the whole risk of existing clients increase and asset quality 
decrease. So a bank must evaluate a borrower’s credit 
risk accurately so that to determine to lend or not, which 
needs the bank to know whole and real information of 
the enterprise’s credit. The information communication is 
especially important for the enterprises lack of collateral. 
If an enterprise and a bank establish host relation, it can 
deal bill discount, fund settlement, staff salary payment, 
etc. with the bank so that to show its private information. 
Along with the bank knows more about it, the possibility 
of getting loan becomes more and more. Once it gets 
loan from the bank, its repayment records will gradually 
accumulate its credit history and an enterprise with good 
credit will become an object that a bank supports actively. 
After “credit” does good to an enterprise, it will commit 
to protect its credit in capital market and the long-term 
cooperation relation between them.
(4) It will be favor for enterprises to reduce borrowing 
cost
Commercial banks have the right to determine the 
interest rate of loans according to the range defined 
by the People’s Bank of China and they will lend 
money to enterprises that have long-term cooperation 
at discounted rate due to following reasons. (a) Long-
term cooperation between a bank and an enterprise will 
reduce the evaluation cost before lending because it has 
analyzed the enterprise’s credit information and will save 
some evaluation expense in the process of loan approval. 
Since the bank has relatively surplus capital and market 
competition is intense, so it will reduce interest rate due 
to the expense saved. (b) Long-term cooperation between 
a bank and an enterprise will reduce the supervision times 
of the banks after lending. After an enterprise accumulates 
good credit history in the bank, the bank will gradually 
reduce supervision frequency, so the supervision cost after 
lending will reduce and the interest rate of lending will 
reduce accordingly. (c) All-round cooperation between 
a bank and an enterprise will reduce the interest rate of 
lending. If an enterprise deals all its bank business such 
as deposit, bill, settlement, electronic payment, and so on 
with its host bank, the bank will lending to it with discount 
rate considering profitable and competitive intermediary 
business. 
3.  SUGGESTIONS FOR CONSTRUCTING 
N E W - T Y P E  B A N K - E N T E R P R I S E 
RELATION IN CHINA 
Although the new-type bank-enterprise relation we 
propose has some advantages over former model, it can 
realize with three preconditions, the first one is enterprises 
can obtain necessary credit support and financial services 
from banks timely; the second one is the safety, liquidity 
and profitability of banks’ loan can be guaranteed 
sufficiently; the third one is the relation are founded on 
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an equal and mutually beneficial basis. In order to realize 
above objects, we propose following suggestions from the 
views of government, banks and enterprises. 
3.1  Construct and Perfect Social Credit System
The social credit system hasn’t established completely 
in China without the punishment mechanism against 
dishonest behavior. So the construction and perfection 
of social credit system will strengthen the honest, self-
protection and right guarding spirits of market entities 
(banks, government, enterprises and relative departments), 
and they will take part in supervising and resisting 
dishonest behaviors willingly. Credit information sharing 
will make dishonest behaviors be found anywhere, 
increase the social cost of faith-breaking people. Once 
an enterprise is blacklisted, it can’t get loans from any 
bank. So banks and enterprises can take use of the credit 
information of social credit system to select honest 
partners and the enterprises with dishonest history will be 
abandoned by all banks. 
3.2  Government Especially Local Government 
Should Transform Their Function
Government in different level should reduce their 
behaviors in intervening the decision-making of banks 
and enterprises. They should adopt effective measures to 
establish the communication channel between banks and 
enterprises, let them choose each other autonomously, 
and transform their function from management to service 
actually.
3.3  Enterprises Should Improve Their Quality
In essence, banks will only select enterprises that can 
make money for them. So Chinese enterprises must clear 
corporation property rights, establish modern enterprise 
management system, introduce advanced technology and 
high-quality talents to increase production efficiency and 
product quality so that to improve their core competition 
capacity and profitability. 
3.4  Complete Related Laws and Regulations
The operation of new-type bank-enterprise relation 
needs equal and well-organized financial environment. 
Although the legislation in finance and banking develop 
rapidly in recent years, which establishes a basic frame 
for the development of finance industry, some articles of 
laws are out of times and the force of laws are not strong. 
For example, according to the revised PRC Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law effective as of June 1, 2007, when an 
enterprise goes bankrupt, the debt it owns to its largest 
creditor-the bank is treated as ordinary debt without 
any priority over other creditors. The property of the 
bankrupt enterprise is first paid for bankrupt expenses, 
staff salary, labor insurance, statutory compensation and 
taxes unpaid in turn, the bank are repaid according to 
the debt ratio together with other creditors. Even if the 
loans are guaranteed with collaterals, it is possible for the 
bank that looses it priority due to various administrative 
intervention, which results in great losses of the largest 
creditor and its credit asset becomes bad account. A 
mountain of bad debts of China’s big four banks are 
formed under such situation, and it is far away from 
solved radically. So the government has the responsibility 
to perfect legal environment and reinforces law 
enforcement. 
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